A network of deception spanning from Singapore to India has ensnared six migrant workers seeking employment, exposing vulnerabilities in how job seekers verify credentials before committing their savings. The alleged architect of the scheme, a man identified as Abdul Raheem—who has since legally changed his name to A.R. Sai—promised to secure employment across Singapore for the Indian nationals by leveraging connections he claimed to possess as a film producer. Instead, he orchestrated an elaborate fraud that extracted more than S$14,000 from victims aged 21 to 49, furnishing them with professionally forged Ministry of Manpower documents that appeared entirely authentic.
The scam unfolded over a four-month period beginning in March 2026, when Vanjur Maideen Syedabthahir, an Indian national who had been working legitimately in Singapore since 2013, became the key conduit for Raheem's scheme. Vanjur had been approached through an acquaintance who introduced him to Raheem, who leveraged his authentic Singapore National Registration Identity Card to establish false credibility. Through a calculated strategy of psychological manipulation, Raheem instructed Vanjur to deposit all payments directly into bank accounts rather than hand over cash, framing this instruction as a precaution to avoid suspicion—a tactic designed to create distance between the scammer and traceable transactions. Raheem quoted S$4,000 for a single S Pass and S$3,000 for each work permit, projecting a total fee of S$19,000 for securing positions for five work permit holders and one S Pass applicant.
Between early March and June 2026, the victims and their families transferred S$14,000 across multiple transactions via PayNow and direct bank deposits into accounts Raheem identified as belonging to his wife. As payment accumulated, Raheem introduced an additional financial hurdle by presenting a purported "training course invoice" dated June 8 for S$4,270, requiring five of the applicants to each pay S$854 to complete a mandatory training course before their work permits could be issued. He justified this demand by claiming the Ministry of Manpower had modified its regulations, now requiring applicants to obtain course certificates as a prerequisite for final work pass approval. This tactic exploited the victims' limited familiarity with Singapore's actual employment procedures and their trust in Raheem's supposed insider knowledge.
On June 12, Raheem transmitted digital copies of four Training Employment Pass In-Principle Approvals via WhatsApp, purportedly issued under the names of four applicants and instructing them to prepare for travel to Singapore by the first week of July. The documents bore all the hallmarks of legitimate MOM correspondence, complete with official formatting and what appeared to be proper authorization codes. However, the scheme began to unravel when Vanjur, then in India, took the precautionary step of verifying the Foreign Identification Numbers listed on the IPAs through the MOM online portal. The verification immediately revealed that the FINs did not exist within Singapore's system—a critical flaw that exposed the documents as counterfeits.
When Vanjur confronted Raheem about the discrepancy, the scammer pivoted to damage control by dismissing the issue as a mere system error. He then introduced a new associate named "Kumar," allegedly based in Chennai, India, and arranged for Vanjur to meet him in person. Kumar doubled down on the fraudulent story, insisting the passes were genuine and claiming Raheem possessed the original documents. In a maneuver designed to maintain leverage, Kumar demanded Vanjur settle the outstanding S$5,000 balance before any original papers would be released. This final demand served to keep the victim engaged while attempting to extract additional funds.
Desperate to resolve the situation and verify the legitimacy of the documents, Vanjur circumvented the scammers entirely by directly contacting the Singapore Consulate-General in Chennai and submitting a formal email to the Ministry of Manpower. On June 16, MOM's Work Pass Division responded with categorical confirmation that no Training Employment Pass applications had been submitted for any of the six men. This definitive answer from the official source shattered any remaining doubt about the documents' authenticity and exposed the entire arrangement as a sophisticated fraud. When Vanjur presented MOM's response to Raheem, the scammer's demeanor shifted sharply toward aggression; he accused Vanjur's family of lacking trust and reiterated his demand for the outstanding balance, abandoning any pretense of legitimacy.
The forged In-Principle Approvals carried employment details claiming the men had secured positions with J&T Express Singapore, a legitimate logistics company, presumably chosen because of its recognizable status as a multinational operation. Yet embedded within one IPA dated June 12 was a glaring temporal inconsistency: the same letter instructed applicants to ensure their Training Employment Pass had been issued before April 28, 2026—a date that preceded the letter's own issuance by more than six weeks. This chronological impossibility would have immediately flagged the document as fraudulent to anyone with detailed knowledge of MOM procedures, suggesting the forger had rushed the production or lacked understanding of the approval workflow.
Vanjur filed a police report in Singapore on June 27, formally initiating a law enforcement investigation into the matter. The Ministry of Manpower simultaneously began its own inquiry to determine whether violations of the Employment of Foreign Manpower Act and the Employment Agencies Act had occurred. Singapore's police confirmed that investigations were underway. The individual identified as Abdul Raheem Lailathul Sultanil Arebeen, 37 years old according to his NRIC shown to Vanjur, had previously undergone a legal name change to A.R. Sai—a change that may have facilitated his evasion of scrutiny or allowed him to operate under a different identity while conducting illicit activities.
When journalists tracked down Raheem to confront him about the allegations, he categorically denied involvement in any scam. Instead, he characterized himself as merely a middleman who had introduced the Indian nationals to his associate Kumar, attempting to shift responsibility entirely onto the third party. This denial strategy, combined with his previous aggressive behavior toward Vanjur, suggests a pattern of opportunistic fraud in which Raheem identifies vulnerable migrant workers seeking employment, leverages his legitimate Singapore identity documents to establish false credibility, and exploits unfamiliarity with Singapore's actual employment verification processes.
The case carries significant implications for Southeast Asian migrant workers across the region who rely on informal networks and intermediaries to secure overseas employment. The sophistication of the forged documents—which passed visual inspection and contained plausible organizational details—underscores how difficult it can be for job seekers to independently verify employment offers before committing substantial sums. The fact that Raheem is already under investigation for a similar scam involving another group of foreign nationals in 2025 suggests this represents part of a recurring criminal enterprise rather than an isolated incident. The case demonstrates the critical importance of directly contacting government agencies to verify employment documentation, bypassing intermediaries entirely.
For Malaysian readers and workers throughout the region, this incident serves as a cautionary reminder about the proliferation of employment scams targeting migrant workers in Singapore and other high-income destinations. The case illustrates how scammers exploit cultural and linguistic barriers, the prestige associated with Singapore employment, and the natural eagerness of job seekers to escape economic limitations in their home countries. While Singapore's Ministry of Manpower maintains robust official channels for work pass verification, the burden falls on individual applicants to exercise vigilance before transferring funds to intermediaries, regardless of how credible those intermediaries may initially appear. The investigation into Raheem's broader criminal network may reveal additional victims and operational details about how such schemes are coordinated across borders.
